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Bernot: Unauthorized Work Stoppages--Carbon Fuel Co. v. UMW

UNAUTHORIZED WORK STOPPAGESCarbonFuel Co. v. UMW
In the last several years, the bituminous coal industry has
experienced an increasing number of wildcat work stoppages.
These stoppages usually take two forms: those which are over disputes between the union and employer, and those which are not
the result of any dispute between the union and employer (sympathy strikes). The former type of stoppage is subject to the
grievance-arbitration provisions contained in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements. Coal operators have typically responded to these strikes by seeking injunctions or money damages
in federal courts. In CarbonFuel Co. v. United Mine Workers, Ithe
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided which forms of work stoppages are actionable and which division of the United Mine Workers-local, district, or international-should be held liable for actionable work stoppages.
Plaintiff employer, Carbon Fuel Company, brought suit under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act 2 against three
local unions of the United Mine Workers of America (UMWA),3
UMWA District 17, and the International Union, seeking injunctive relief and damages relative to forty-eight work stoppages
which occurred during the years 1969 through 1973 at various
mines of Carbon Fuel in southern West Virginia.' Carbon Fuel and
the defendants were parties to a collective bargaining agreement
known as the "National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1971," which expired prior to the trial of the case.5 The court held
that the expiration of the 1971 contract rendered the request for
injunctive relief moot, leaving only the question of damages to be
tried.'
582 F.2d 1346 (4th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Carbon Fuel].
2 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
The local unions named as defendants were Nos. 6572, 7627, and 2236.
Carbon Fuel Company v. United Mine Workers, 582 F.2d 1346, 1347 (4th Cir.
1978).
'Id. at 1348.
Id. The type of injunctive relief that Carbon Fuel requested is unclear from
the court's opinion. However, a telephone discussion with David D. Johnson, Esquire, of the firm Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell of Charleston, West Virginia,
counsel for'the plaintiff, yielded informatiorl that the request for injunctive relief
was designed to prevent the recurrence of a pattern of illegal picketing and illegal
work stoppages. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
expiration of one collective bargaining agreement and its replacement by a new
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The issues at trial were: (1) whether the alleged stoppages had
occurred, (2) whether any of the alleged stoppages were actionable,
and (3) what damages should be allocated to each actionable stoppage.7 The case was tried before a jury which considered the evidence relative to each stoppage separately and returned a separate
verdict for each stoppage. Verdicts were returned by the jury
against all defendants, 8 judgments were entered, and all defendants appealed.
The case came to trial after the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers,' but before the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge v. United Steelworkers.'5
The case was tried and evidence presented on the basis of Armco."
Seventeen of the forty-eight stoppages were sympathy strikes, 2
and the district court, relying on Armco's holding that a mandatory arbitration clause implied a commitment not to engage in
sympathy strikes,'3 ruled as a matter of law that all forty-eight of
the stoppages were in violation of the collective bargaining agreement." On appeal, Carbon Fuel conceded that in light of Buffalo
Forge it was error for the court to direct the jury that the seventeen
sympathy strikes violated the collective bargaining agreement.,'
Despite this concession, Carbon Fuel contended that the judgments with respect to the sympathy strikes should not be vacated
collective bargaining agreement did not render moot a prayer for such prospective
injunctive relief. See Bituminous Coal Operators Ass'n v. United Mine Workers,
585 F.2d 586 (3rd Cir. 1978).
582 F.2d at 1348.
Verdicts against the International Union aggregated $206,547.80; against District 17 $242,130.80; and against the three local unions $722,347.43.
9 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975).
" 428 U.S. 397 (1976).

582 F.2d at 1348.
The court held that these stoppages qualified as sympathy strikes under
Buffalo Forge, even though they were not in support of any "sister unions," since
they were not the result of any dispute between the unions and the company. The
reasons for the stoppages varied, ranging from political protests to intra-union
disputes. 582 F.2d at 1348 n.2.
" Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (4th Cir.
"

22

1974).

" 582 F.2d at 1348.
, The Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 408 n.10, stated:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals . . .and other courts, . ..

Armco Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 505 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (CA
4, 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877,. . .have assumed that a mandatory
arbitration clause implies a commitment not to engage in sympathy

strikes, they are wrong.
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and dismissed, but rather that they should be remanded to the
district court with directions that they be referred to arbitration
upon the issue of whether the sympathy strikes violated the collective bargaining agreement."6 Carbon Fuel argued that if the arbitrator found for the company, then the court should reinstate the
money judgments against the unions as to the sympathy strikes;
and conversely, if the arbitrator found for the unions, the judgments should be finally vacated. This argument raised the issue
of whether a sympathy strike can ever be the basis for money
damages, absent an express no-strike clause.
The court found the answer to this contention of Carbon Fuel
in Buffalo Forge itself. The court felt that the Supreme Court had
made it clear that in the absence of an express no-strike clause "a
sympathy strike is neither actionable nor arbitrable."'"
This holding of the Fourth Circuit is a correct application of
Buffalo Forge. Buffalo F6rge indicates that in order for a work
stoppage to be enjoinable pending arbitration, the collective bargaining agreement must provide for arbitration procedures, and
the dispute that precipitates the stoppage must be subject to binding arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.' On the other hand, however, an award of monetary damages resulting from a work stoppage is proper only if the company
shows a breach of contractual duty not to strike. 9 If the collective
bargaining agreement does not contain an express no-strike clause,
as in CarbonFuel, then whether the union is under a contractual
'

582 F.2d at 1348.

Id. at 1348. In Buffalo Forge, the arbitrability of the question whether the
production employees were required to cross the picket line was not disputed due
to the fact that the collective bargaining agreement included an express no-strike
clause. However, the Supreme Court stated that:
had the contract not contained a no-strike clause or had the clause expressly excluded sympathy strikes, there would have been no possible
"

basis for implying from the existence of an arbitration clause a promise

not to strike that could have been violated by the sympathy strike in this
case.
428 U.S. at 408.

This conclusion of the Carbon Fuel court is also in accord with the Third
Circuit's decision in United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 548 F.2d
67 (3rd Cir. 1976), and the Sixth Circuit's decision in Southern Ohio Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers, 551 F.2d 695 (6th Cir. 1977).
,1United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 548 F.2d 67, 72 (3rd Cir.

1976).
10Id.
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duty not to strike, and hence whether damages can be awarded for
breach of that duty, depends on whether the dispute underlying
the work stoppage is arbitrable."5 In Carbon Fuel, as in Buffalo
Forge, the sympathy strikes were not "over any dispute between
the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the
arbitration provisions of the contract." 2' This was true because the
underlying disputes in the sympathy strikes, i.e., the political protests and intra-union disputes,n were not subject to, nor could they
have been resolved by, arbitration between Carbon Fuel and the
defendants. A court cannot imply a promise not to strike over
nonarbitrable matters unless the collective bargaining agreement
contains an express no-strike clause.Y The only justification for the
"Boys Markets exception" to the Norris-LaGuardia prohibition
21
against enjoining strikes is subversion of the arbitration process.
In Carbon Fuel the strikes had "neither the purpose nor the effect
of denying or evading an obligation to arbitrate or of depriving the
employer of its bargain,"2 and hence, there was no basis for the
implication of a promise not to engage in sympathy strikes. Therefore, such work stoppages could not have been a breach of contract
for which the union could be held liable in damages. The money
judgments based on the seventeen sympathy strikes were properly
reversed.
As to the remaining thirty-one work stoppages, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that they were precipitated by
In Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), the Supreme
Court held, inter alia, that a strike to settle a dispute which a collective bargaining
agreement provided should be settled exclusively and finally by compulsory arbi.
tration constituted a violation of the agreement, even though the agreement did not
contain an explicit no-strike clause. The Court affirmed a state court award of
damages for violation of the implied obligation not to strike over arbitrable disputes. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
2,Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 407 (emphasis in
original).
u See note 12, supra.
2 Note, Unauthorized Work Stoppages-"StrangerPickets" in the Coalfields,
80 W. VA. L. Rav. 492 (1978).
24 Id. In Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), the
Supreme Court held that strikes over arbitrable issues subverted the national labor
policy favoring peaceful, voluntary resolution of industrial disputes through arbitration, and therefore could be enjoined. The Court stated that limiting the use of
injunctive relief only to situations where it is necessary to promote the policy
favoring arbitration did not sacrifice the core purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
Id. at 253.
2 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. at 408.
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disputes between members of the UMWA and Carbon Fuel which
were subject to the grievance-arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement." All of these stoppages were found to
be wildcat strikes and the court was faced with deciding the responsibility, if any, of the several defendants for the resultant
damages. The court bifurcated the liability issue by dividing the
defendants into two groups. The local unions comprised the first
group, District 17 and the International Union were in the second
group.
Relying on the "mass action" theory,n the court held the local
unions liable. The Carbon Fuel court found the "mass action"
theory to represent
a sensible and pragmatic approach to this difficult problem in
the area of labor relations. In view of the uncontradicted evidence that all of the members of the defendant Locals, including their officers, participated in the strikes, the theory was
properly employed by the district court in placing responsibility
upon the Locals.2
Under this theory, a union may be held liable for formally unauthorized strikes on the ground that concerted action by members
of a union requires union leadership. As long as the union is functioning as a union, i.e., as a dynamic entity, it will be held responsible for the mass action of its members. 2' Under the mass action
theory, the fact that the employer cannot prove instigation, authorization or ratification of the wildcat strike by union officials
will not insulate the union from liability for damages. The mass
action theory treats the individual strikers as agents of the union
and holds the union liable for their actions.3 ' The collective action
of the individual members of the union presents a solid basis for
implying union responsibility. 31The failure of union leaders to take
28

582 F.2d at 1349.

For a historical perspective of the mass action theory, see Fishman &Brown,
Union Responsibility for Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE L. REv. 1017, 1025-29 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as Fishman & Brown], and Fairweather, Employer Actions and
Options in Response to Strikes in Breach of Contract, N.Y.U. 18TH ANN. CONF.
LAB. 129, 147-149 (1966).

ON

- 582 F.2d at 1349, 1350.
" United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563, 566-67 (D.D.C.
1948).
30 Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1027.
31 Id.
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affirmative steps to end an illegal strike is theoretically a consent
to and adoption of the wildcat strike."
The mass action theory is not, however, a theory of strict
union liability. Unions can protect themselves from liability for
damages under the mass action theory by taking action which
would show that there is no basis for implying union conduct or
responsibility. The union must show that it "isn't operating and
functioning as a union, and that its members are not controlled
from headquarters.""
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion that damages be assessed
against the locals seems correct. If, as the court found, the
thirty-one nonsympathy strikes were over issues which the union
had agreed to arbitrate, they were clearly in breach of the implied
no-strike obligation which would arise from the agreement to arbitrate those issues.Y Since the uncontradicted evidence showed that
all of the members of the defendant locals engaged in concerted
strikes not formally authorized by the union, the mass action
theory provided a proper basis for holding the locals responsible for
damages 5
This brings us to the Carbon Fuel court's treatment of the
question of the liability of District 17 and the International for
damages. The district court had instructed the jury that these
defendants had the duty and responsibility to use all reasonable
means to prevent or terminate the wildcat strikes, and that the
failure to do so would render them liable for the work stoppages."
The defendant asserted that it was error for the district court to
so instruct the jury because the instruction ignored the history of
the collective bargaining agreement and misconstrued its terms,
and additionally, that the controlling Fourth Circuit precedent 7
mandated that, absent evidence that the District or International
32 Id.
= United States v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. at 567.
" See note 20, supra.
2 Since the court in CarbonFuel found that the local union officers had also
participated in the strike, 582 F.2d at 1350, it appears that the court could also have

relied on the statutory agency theory of sections 301(b) and (e) of the LMRA, 29
U.S.C. § 185(b) and (e), as a means of finding the locals liable. This theory was
not, however, mentioned in the opinion. See Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at
1024.
u 582 F.2d at 1350.
1 United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir.

1955).
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Union instigated, supported, ratified or encouraged any of the
work stoppages, the defendant's motions for directed verdicts must
be granted.31
Turning to the bargaining history agreement, the court found
that the history of bargaining between the UMWA and the various
coal operator's associations showed: (1) as late as 1941, the contract contained an express agreement not to strike; (2) following
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act," the 1947 contract rescinded
all "no-strike" and similar clauses which had been contained in
earlier agreements; 0 (3) from 1950 to 1952, the contract contained
an express promise on the part of the union to use its "best efforts"
to prevent work stoppages; and (4) the "best efforts" provision was
eliminated two years later, and the agreements from 1972 through
1977 neither imposed any "best efforts" duties nor contained any
indemnity obligation which would give rise to vicarious liability for
local wildcat stoppages." From this bargaining history, the Fourth
Circuit declared that they would not follow the Third Circuit's
holding in UnitedStates Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers42 that
"[a] covenant to maintain the integrity of the contract necessarily
embraces a reasonable efforts obligation to comply with the
[implied] no-strike promise."43 The court felt that implying such
a "reasonable efforts" obligation on the part of the union would
rewrite the terms of the contract upon which the parties had
agreed."
The bargaining history argument, however, lacks persuasiveness due to the fact that it has not been followed in other contexts.
As the court notes, the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements prior to 1947 contained express no-strike clauses." The nostrike clause was removed from the contract in 1947,46 and until
1968 was expressly disclaimed in the collective bargaining agreements. 47 Despite this history of the removal of an express no-strike
582 F.2d at 1350.

29 U.S.C. § 141-187 (1947).
' The

court stated that the reason for this was to protect the union from
potential lawsuits under the Taft-Hartley Act. 582 F.2d at 1350.
'

582 F.2d at 1350.

534 F.2d 1063 (3rd Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1073.
" 582 F.2d at 1350.
4

45Id.
"Id.
"

This express disclaimer, found in the "Miscellaneous" section of the Na-
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clause and the express disclaimer of any no-strike obligation, many

courts have still implied a no-strike obligation from the presence
of an arbitration procedure in the coal industry agreement." The

Supreme Court itself has implied a no-strike obligation in this line
of coal industry contracts, even though the parties had actually
removed the express no-strike provision from an earlier contract."
Bargaining history might be one factor a court could look to

for guidance in interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, but
such history should not be conclusive. This is especially true when
such a theory is at conflict with the national labor policy favoring
resolution of industrial disputes by arbitration."
Turning now to a construction of the terms of the collective

bargaining agreement, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to imply a
duty to use reasonable efforts to end the illegal wildcat strikes
seems erroneous, even if based on a contract interpretation theory.

It would seem that the District's and International's affirmation to "maintain the integrity of this contract" and their agreement "that all disputes and claims which are not settled by agreement shall be settled by the machinery provided in the 'Settlement

of Disputes' Article in this agreement"'" vitiate any claim that an
tional Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968, is as follows:
1. Any and all provisions in either the Appalachian Joint Wage Agreement of June 19, 1941, or the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
of April 11, 1945, containing any "no-strike" or "penalty" clause or
clauses or any clause denominated "Illegal Suspension of Work" are
hereby rescinded, cancelled, abrogated and made null and void.
This clause does not appear in the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of
1971, which was the next agreement entered into by the UMWA and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association.
48See, e.g., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 436 F.2d 551, 55456 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 930 (1971); and cases discussed in note
49, infra.
1' Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). In Old Ben
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers Local 1482, 457 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1972), the
court was faced with this very argument, which is analogous to the bargaining
history argument raised in CarbonFuel. In the Old Ben Coal case, the union argued
that the court could not imply a no-strike obligation because the bargaining history
showed that an express no-strike obligation had been removed from prior agreements and any no-strike promises were expressly disclaimed. Despite this argument, the court did not hesitate to imply a no-strike obligation. 457 F.2d at 164.
50See text accompanying notes 69-87, infra, for a discussion of how a refusal
to imply a reasonable efforts obligation on the part of the International and District
to end wildcat strikes conflicts with national labor policy.
51This particular clause has appeared in the National Bituminous Coal Wage
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express contractual basis for implying a reasonable efforts obligation is lacking in the CarbonFuel case. This clause, combined with
the number of work stoppages that occurred, seems to swing the
pendulum in favor of holding the International and District 17
pecuniarily liable. Of the forty-eight work stoppages complained
of by Carbon Fuel, thirty-one were found to be violative of the
collective bargaining agreement. 52 The court stated that these
strikes took place during the period 1969 through 1973.11 Taking
the most liberal view toward the union by assuming five full years,
this breaks down to one illegal work stoppage approximately every
fifty-eight days.5 ' With such a dismal track record, it should have
become obvious to the International and District divisions of the
Union that the local officers were not even trying to "maintain the
integrity of the contract," and were in fact, as the court stated,
participating in the illegal strikes." At some point along the way,
the District and International should have started using reasonable means" to end the pattern of illegal strikes so as to maintain
the integrity of the contract.57 Such disregard by the International
and the District of their promise to maintain the integrity of the
contract, and the sanction of that contract breach by the Fourth
Agreements of 1968, 1971, 1974, and 1978, with the clause being carried over almost
verbatim to each successive agreement. See Paragraph 3 of the "Miscellaneous"
section of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1968; Article XX of
the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971; and Article XXVII of the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements of 1974 and 1978. Therefore, for all
periods of time pertinent to the CarbonFuel case, a clause requiring both the union
and the employer to maintain the integrity of their contract was in effect.
52 582 F.2d at 1349.
Id. at 1348.
5"Five years times 365 days per year equals 1825 days, divided by 31 illegal
work stoppages equals approximately one illegal work stoppage every 58 days. If the
sympathy strikes are included, Carbon Fuel was subjected to work stoppages on the
average of one every 38 days, viz.: 1825 days divided by 48 work stoppages equals
approximately one work stoppage every 38 days.
582 F.2d at 1350.
"' What are "reasonable means" is discussed in text accompanying notes 99101, intra.
11The UMWA CONsT. art. 2, para. 4 (1976), states that one of the "Objects"
of the International is "[t]o administer and enforce collective agreements creating
rights to wages and other terms and conditions of employment." Art. 9, § 6 of the
same constitution states the following about the District divisions: "The District,
through its officers and Executive Board, shall be responsible for implementing and
administering all collective agreements covering any members of the District, and
shall take all appropriate measures to insure that those agreements are fairly applied, fully enforced, and faithfully obeyed."

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

Circuit, rewrites the terms of the contract. The court, in effect,
read this provision out of the collective bargaining agreement,
thereby depriving the employer of his bargain.
Under the principles which control the interpretation of
collective bargaining agreements, courts cannot rewrite contracts
for the parties, and can imply obligations only when the express
terms of the agreements make such implication necessary to effectuate the bargain of the parties and the purpose of the contract as
a whole. 8 From these principles, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, in Eazor Express, Inc. v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters,"9 held that an obligation to use reasonable means to end wildcat strikes could be implied into collective
bargaining agreements. This court stated that "[olne of the premises central to the concept of collective bargaining . . . is that
labor unions represent and bargain on behalf of their members."10
The main benefit an employer can reasonably expect to derive by
dntering into a collective bargaining agreement is the assurance of
uninterrupted operations during the term of the agreement.' The
importance of the recognition of a union of that expectation with
respect to implied no-strike provisions is critical to industrial
peace. 2 Thus, labor agreements should be construed with that
expectation in mind." From this premise, the Eazor court felt that
it was reasonable, as a matter of interpreting the agreements with
a view toward effecting the purpose of the collective bargaining
agreement as a whole, to imply an obligation on the part of the
union to take reasonable measures to prevent or end an activity
engaged in by its members in which it, as an entity, was not free
to engage."
Kellog Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir. 1972) (quoting Refinery Employ.
ees' Union v. Continental Oil Co., 160 F. Supp. 723, 731 (W.D. La. 1958)).
11357 F. Supp. 158, 164 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affl'd, 520 F.2d 951 (3rd Cir. 1975).
6OId.
*, Id.; see, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 454 (1957).
See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947).
62 Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. 158,
164 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
63Id.
" Id. Any contention that there is no basis for implying a "reasonable efforts"
obligation from a no-strike covenant that is itself implied by law is without merit.
Such an argument would necessarily rest on the premise that the no-strike covenant
which the Supreme Court found implicit in the almost identical contract in Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974), somehow enjoys a less
significant legal status than an express no-strike clause. Such an approach was laid
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Collective bargaining agreements such as those under discussion here impose a "continuing day-to-day obligation on the parties to fulfill their terms in good faith," 5 especially with respect to
the implied obligation that there should be no strikes pending the
use of the grievance-arbitration provision. If the employer has suffered damages from the breach of an implied contractual duty not
to strike, and if the International or District could have lessened
or avoided the damages that resulted from the illegal strikes by
taking reasonable steps within their power to end the pattern of
illegal strikes (and hence effectuate the contract) failure to take
such action is a fair basis for implying responsibility on the part
of the International or District. Rather than construe the contract
so that the international and district divisions of the union escape
liability when their members breach the implied no-strike obligation, courts should favor a construction of the concomitant arbitration/no-strike promises which will make such mutual promises
binding, thereby giving the contract legal effect.66
The responsibility of the union for the wrongful breaches of
contract is clear, and a failure by the courts to apply a proper
effective remedy in the form of an award of damages to the aggrieved party has the effect of freeing the union and its members
from liability for their actions. Such a failure can only militate
against the desirable ideal of "union responsibility."" An award of
damages payable to the aggrieved party is a step in the direction
of preserving "union responsibility" and its integrity as the
"responsible party" to the collective bargaining agreement.
The decision in CarbonFuel not to imply a duty on the part
of the International and District to use reasonable efforts to end
to rest as long ago as Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962),
when the Court held that a refusal to imply a no-strike obligation from a binding
arbitration clause "would obviously do violence to accepted principles of traditional
contract law." Id. at 105. The unions are parties to a contract not to strike over an
arbitrable dispute, and they have an obligation to use all reasonable efforts to
perform that contract. Concern with the integrity and efficacy of the agreed-upon
arbitration process is no less compelling when the covenant not to strike is implied
rather than expressed. United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 534 F.2d
1063, 1073 (3rd Cir. 1976).
63Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951, 959
(3rd Cir. 1975).
'5Id. at 960.
67Brynmore Press, Inc., 7 Lab. Arb. 648 at 657-58 (1947) (Rains, Arb.).

"Id.
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the pattern of wildcat strikes also seems erroneous from a national
labor policy viewpoint. In passing .the Labor-Management Relations Act, Congress adopted the policy that industrial disputes
should be settled by the grievance-arbitration procedures agreed to
by the parties, and not by economic warfare.' This federal policy
favoring arbitration of labor disputes is firmly grounded in section
203(d) of the LMRA, which states in part: "Final adjustment by
a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."7 0
An obligation to arbitrate a labor dispute does not arise, however, by operation of law alone. A party must arbitrate his grievance only if he has specifically agreed to do so.7 To facilitate the
national labor policy favoring arbitration, parties should be encouraged to include grievance-arbitration provisions in their
collective bargaining agreements7 2 An employer will feel little encouragement to enter an agreement which contains a mandatory
arbitration provision which is specifically enforceable against him
unless the law provides some protection for what he expects in
return, that is, the concomitant agreement not to strike over arbitrable issues.3 What the employer hopes to achieve by giving an
agreement to arbitrate in return for an implied no-strike obligation
is a stable work force and uninterrupted production. If the unions
are not penalized for breaching their part of the agreement, they
will have no incentive to live up to the terms of the agreement.
Such a situation will likely result in employers refusing to enter
agreements containing congressionally favored mandatory arbitration provisions. On the other hand, an award of damages to the
employer when the union fails to take reasonable steps to make its
members comply with the implied no-strike obligation is a step in
the direction of enforcing this concomitant promise by the union
not to strike. The union's efforts to comply with the no-strike
clause will increase as its potential liability for breach of that
clause increases, thereby furthering the national labor policy of
resolution of industrial disputes by arbitration.
See Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1029.

7' 29
'
72

U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).

Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974).
See Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1029.
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970).
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An examination of the legislative history behind section 301
of the LMRA shows that both the Senate Report and the House
Report indicated a concern that unions as well as employers be
bound to collective bargaining agreements. 7 The Senate Report
summed up the philosophy of section 301 as follows: "Statutory
recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding and
enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote
a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agree75
For this reaments, and will thereby promote industrial peace.
son, collective bargaining contracts were made equally binding
and enforceable on both parties.7" Under section 301, courts have
7
vigorously protected grievance-arbitration procedures. As the
concomitant obligation, a no-strike commitment, whether express
8
or implied, also deserves vigorous judicial protection. When the
Supreme Court overruled Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson' in
0
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770,1 it concluded that
allowing an employer to enjoin a violation of a no-strike obligation
furthered the national labor policy favoring arbitration.' The
Court reasoned that Sinclair's prohibition against injunctive enforcement of a no-strike obligation "casts serious doubt upon the
effective enforcement of a vital element of stable labormanagement relations-arbitration agreements with their attendant no-strike obligations." From this it concluded that "Sinclair
2
does not make a viable contribution to federal labor policy."" By
the same reasoning, theories which permit unions to escape liability when they breach their no-strike obligation also cast serious
71Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 453 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Lincoln Mills]. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1947); H.R. REP.
No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947).
75 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), quoted in Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. at 454.
1' As stated in the House Report, section 301 "makes labor organizations
equally responsible with employers for contract violations and provides for suit by
either against the other in the United States district courts." H.R. REP. No. 245,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), quoted in Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 454.
11Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1030.
71 Id. In Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974)
(quoting Boys Markets, 398 U.S. at 248), the Court stated that "[a] no-strike
obligation, express or implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration."
79370 U.S. 195 (1962).
- 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
" Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1030.
'2

398 U.S. at 249.
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doubt upon the effective enforcement of arbitration agreements
and likewise do not make a viable contribution to our national
labor policy.8 Since section 301(a) not only gives federal courts
jurisdiction to hear cases, but authorizes them to fashion substantive law from the policies of our national labor laws as well, 4 a
damage remedy against unions for their failure to take adequate
steps to end wildcat strikes which violate the collective bargaining
agreement, could, and should, be created directly under section
301(a).1

To the extent that any union division refuses to use appropriate means to bring an end to illegal wildcat strikes, it can be said
to have breached some of the valued rights granted to the union
under our national labor policy." The international and district
unions should be monetarily penalized when their members breach
these rights by disregarding their contract obligations, the internal
union laws, or the federal labor statutes.Y
The CarbonFuel court also placed a great deal of reliance on
United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Company," an
earlier Fourth Circuit case. The court felt that the Carbon Fuel
case fell "squarely within the four comers of Haislip."9 In Haislip,
a strike occurred at the plaintiff's bakery because two employees
were discharged for unexplained absences on the preceding day.'"
On the day following the strike, union representatives met with
management in an attempt to work out a plan for ending the
strike. The strikers refused to return to work until the two discharged workers were reinstated.' Management refused to reinstate the discharged workers, and hence the meeting was unsuccessful in ending the strike. The following day, two days after the
strike began, the bakery went out of business, claiming that its
business was destroyed by the wildcat strike. 2 Two years later the
& Brown, supra note 27, at 1030.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456.
'3 See Note, Individual Union Members Not Liable for Breach of Contractual
No-Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorizedby Union, 86 HARV. L. REv.447,
456 (1972).
" Republic Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, 570 F.2d 467, 479 (3rd Cir.
1978).
" Id. at 480.
"3223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
93Fishman

'" 582 F.2d at 1351.

11223 F.2d at 874.
'3
32

Id.
Id. at 875.
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employer brought an action for damages under section 301(a) of
the LMRA against the United Construction Workers, a division of
UMWA District 50, and the International Union of the UMWA on
the grounds that it suffered damages "'by being obliged to liquidate its business' ,9 because the union had breached its contract
by striking, instead of arbitrating the dispute.
The court held that the defendants were not liable because
there was no evidence that they adopted, encouraged, or prolonged
the continuance of the strike." The court felt that even if the
defendant's representatives "had done nothing when plaintiff
called on them to help get the men back to work, there would have
been no liability on the part of the defendants.""5 The facts of the
Haislip case (one strike which lasted only two days) are so different
from the facts of the Carbon Fuel case (forty-eight strikes over a
four to five year period), that it should have had little, if any,
persuasive effect as precedent. Further, to the extent that Haislip
was inconsistent with the contract interpretation analysis and national labor policy outlined earlier in this Comment, it should be
overruled.
Turning now to the extent of the union's duty to discourage
wildcat strikes, this Comment advocates the position that it is
unacceptable, on either a contract interpretation analysis or on a
national labor policy basis, to hold that the International and District have no obligation to use reasonable efforts to bring wildcat
strikes to an end. This "no duty" standard appears at one end of
the continuum upon which the union's reasonable efforts duty lies.
At the other extreme is strict liability on the part of the union for
the actions of its members. This standard is also unacceptable,
however, because it would give unwarranted power to dissident
minorities. Such a minority could coerce the larger, satisfied majority of workers into accepting their views by threatening or conducting wildcat strikes. The majority would be forced to capitulate
to the minority position in order to avoid financial ruin. The proper
extent of the union's duty to discourage wildcat strikes, then, falls
somewhere between a standard imposing no duty and one imposing strict liability. A standard which would impose an affirmative
9 Id. at 874.
'
':

Id. at 877.
Id.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1979

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 14

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81

duty on the union to prevent or end wildcat strikes seems appropriate. 6
In assessing liability under this standard, the inquiry should
not be whether any potential measure would have been effective,
but whether "reasonable, available, significant and potentially
productive" 7 measures to end the strike were taken." Implicit in
this statement also is the notion that the inquiry should not be
whether the potential measures taken by the union were ultimately
effective. If a union division is sued for an illegal wildcat strike,
and the employer claims liability exists because the union failed
to take reasonable steps to end the illegal strike, the union should
have a liability-absolving defense if it can show that it did take
reasonable steps to end the illegal strike, in spite of the fact that
the steps taken were ineffective. The nature and sufficiency of the
union's action must be determined by the circumstances. Ultimately, union responsibility should be coextensive with union
power to end the wildcat strike. The parties should, of course, be
free to include in the collective bargaining agreement what their
understanding of a "reasonable efforts" obligation to end wildcat
strikes will entail.
In CarbonFuel, reasonable, available, significant and potentially productive measures to end the pattern of illegal strikes were
available to District 17 'and the International, but were not taken.
It appears that either District 17 or the International could have
instituted proceedings interially through the union against the
local union members who were organizing and instigating the
strikes, which proceedings could have resulted in those members
being fined or reprimanded." The same action could have been
11See Note, Individual Union Members Not Liable for Breach of Contractual
No-Strike Clause Even When Strike Unauthorizedby Union, 86 HARV. L. REV. 447,
456-57 (1972).
91Eazor Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 357 F. Supp. 158,
166 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
" Fishman & Brown, supra note 27, at 1033.
" The UMWA CONST. art. 12, § 7 (1976), declares that a union member shall
not "engage in any strikes other than those authorized by the International Union."
Art. 12, § 8, provides that "[elvery member shall have the obligation to support
the enforcement of all collective bargaining agreements made by the International
Union ... and not ... violate the provisions of such agreements." It appears then

that the local members and officers who engaged in the illegal strikes in Carbon
Fuel clearly violated their own constitutional obligations of membership. Art. 15,
§ 1 of this same constitution provides that charges that a member violated his
obligations as a member or as a local union officer may be brought by any union
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taken against the local union officers who were participating in the
strikes.'00
Furthermore, it appears that the International President
could have suspended the District officers for failure to take all
appropriate measures to insure that the collective bargaining
agreement was fairly applied, fully enforced and faithfully obeyed. ' If union members and officers are aware that violations
member or members. The charges are tried in a trial-like procedure before a trial
committee composed of members of the local union. Id., art. 15, § 5. "By majority
vote, the Trial Committee may reprimand the accused or may fine the accused up
to $200." Id., art. 15, § 8.
Since the District Officers and Executive Board are "responsible for implementing and administering all collective bargaining agreements covering any members of the District" and also for taking "all appropriate measures to insure that
those agreements are fairly applied, fully enforced and faithfully obeyed," id., art.
9, § 6, see note 57 supra, it appears that the District officials could have attempted
to end the pattern of illegal strikes by selectively instituting proceedings to fine or
reprimand those members of the defendant locals who were organizing and instituting the illegal strikes. By instituting proceedings only against those members who
were instigating or organizing the strikes, the union could punish those members
who were the greatest cause of the trouble, and also preserve support for the union
leadership by not unjustly penalizing those members who were not in support of
the strikes.
As to the International, one of its "objects" is "[t]o administer and enforce
collective agreements creating rights to wages and other terms and conditions of
employment." Id., art. 2, para. 4. Furthermore, since the International has
"supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority over all members and subordinate branches," id., art. 3, § 2, it appears that the International could also have
selectively begun proceedings to fine or reprimand those members of the defendant
locals who were organizing and instigating the illegal strikes.
The possible union actions to end the pattern of illegal strikes outlined in this
note, and notes 100 & 101 infra, are set out solely for the purpose of showing that
there were steps the union could have taken under its own internal rules to end the
pattern of illegal strikes. The union leadership should, however, be able to retain a
certain degree of flexibility to adjust to the dynamics of a wildcat strike. The union
should be allowed a degree of latitude within which to judge which sanctions it feels
will help bring the strikes to an end.
I The International and District could have selectively begun proceedings
against the local union officers in their capacity as members under the procedure
outlined in note 99 supra.By bringing pressure on the local officers, who are ostensibly the leaders of the local, the union could have impressed upon them the seriousness with which attempts to end the illegal strikes must be undertaken. If the other
members of the local know their leaders do not support their strike actions, the
incentive of the other members to strike will likely be lessened.
,"I
Charges that a District officer has violated his obligation as a District officer
may be brought by any member of the District or by any member of the International Executive Board. UMWA CONsT. art. 16, §§ 1, 3 (1976). Since the District
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of the union's no-strike obligation will result in penalties being
imposed upon them by the union hierarchy, the incentive to violate that no-strike obligation will decrease." 2 Unions will have no
incentive to impose such penalties, however, unless they are held
liable for not doing so.103
The CarbonFuel court, relying on the Haislipcase, states that
the employer's remedy for ending wildcat strikes is discharge of the
striking employees. 4 Selective discharge, however, often has unfortunate consequences. The wildcat strikers often refuse to return
to work until the discharged employees are reinstated."' When
faced with the choice of ending the strike or reinstating the strikers, most employers cannot afford to resist the demands of reinstatement. If the employer gives in to the demands, he encourages
the union to use the same tactic in the future, and thereby subverts
the arbitration procedure.' Unions will feel no need to arbitrate
their grievance if they believe they can safely coerce a favorable
resolution by striking. 7
An industry contract which provides for stable labormanagement relations via settlement of disputes by arbitration,
and not by strikes, is a worthy objective and one favored by national labor policy. The bituminous coal industry has had such a
contract for many years. The problem, however, has been the failure of the parties to live up to the terms of their contract. The
national labor policy favoring arbitration will be furthered if courts
hold parties to a collective bargaining agreement liable for breach
of their concomitant arbitration-no-strike promises. The mass action theory which was adopted by the CarbonFuel court, and the
17 officers did not take "all appropriate measures" to insure that the collective
bargaining agreement was fully enforced and faithfully obeyed, they could be said
to have violated their constitutional responsibility to implement and administer the

agreement. See id., art. 9, § 6, and note 57 supra. In any case against a District
official where the International President finds that assuring performance or enforcement of collective bargaining agreements so requires, he may suspend the
accused officer from any and all of his duties pending trial of the charges. UMWA
CONST. art. 16, § 5.

"I Fishman & Brown, supra note 70, at 1022.
'o

Id.

, 582 F.2d at 1351.
'01 See, e.g., Cedar Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 560 F.2d 1153, 1157 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978).

1*1Fishman

& Brown, supra note 27, at 1022.

Id.

107
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reasonable efforts obligation on the part of the District and International divisions of the UMWA which it rejected, both present
reasonable methods of furthering this national labor policy.
Joseph E. Bernot
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